Part I · Chapter 4 · Lectures 3 & 4

Marr, Tinbergen & representations

The two frameworks the course uses to ask any brain question properly — and the demos from Lecture 4 showing that how you represent a problem decides how you solve it.

1. Why we need frameworks at all

Marr's analogy "Trying to understand perception by studying only neurons is like trying to understand bird flight by studying only feathers." — David Marr, Vision (1982)

Something as complex as the brain can't be understood from a single perspective. You could know every feather on a bird and still not know that flight is about generating lift. You could know aerodynamics and still not know what a feather is made of. Both are true, at different levels. The frameworks in this chapter are checklists that stop you answering at only one level.

2. Marr's three levels

LevelQuestionWho asks itBird-flight analogy
ComputationalWhy? What problem is being solved, and why?—Get off the ground
AlgorithmicWhat rules? What representations and processes solve it? ("software")Cognitive psychologistAerodynamics — lift
ImplementationHow physically? What hardware — or wetware — runs it?NeuroscientistFeathers, muscles
Common mistake — the study guide's shorthand The L3 study guide writes "Computation (why) · Algorithm (what) · Implementation (how)". Careful: "how" there means how physically. On the Lecture 8 surface-perception slides the professor labels Algorithmic as "how?" and Implementation as "where?". Don't memorize the one-word tags — memorize the full question each level asks.

The lecture's flight table

The same computational goal can have several algorithms, and the same algorithm several implementations. That's the key insight — the levels are loosely coupled:

ComputationalAlgorithm (software)Implementation (hardware / wetware)
Flight gives access to food and mates, and escape from predatorsFlapping wingsBird
ThrustRocket engine
Rotation to generate liftHelicopter blades
Temperature differentialHot-air balloon

Worked through: edge detection

The study guide's version of the algorithm: "higher numbers = more white → edge detected if there's a big difference in numbers." Here's what that means concretely. Paint on the grid; each cell is a pixel's brightness.

The Sobel operator — click pixels to paint, then look for edges
What to notice: the interior of a uniform region scores 0 — no change, no edge — however bright it is. Only the boundaries light up. Try "Smooth ramp": brightness still changes, but gently, so raise the threshold and the "edge" disappears. Edges are sharp changes, not brightness.
Try itOne Sobel step by hand

Three rows of pixels, each row identical: 10 10 10 200 200. The horizontal Sobel kernel is

$$G_x=\begin{bmatrix}-1&0&1\\-2&0&2\\-1&0&1\end{bmatrix}$$

Centre the kernel on the middle row at columns 2, 3 and 4 (counting from 1). Multiply each pixel by the kernel entry on top of it and add. Where is the edge?

Step 1 — What's the kernel doing?

Left column gets negative weights, right column positive: it computes (right side − left side), with the middle row counted twice. It's a "difference detector".

Step 2 — Column 2 (neighbours: 10, 10, 10)

Each row contributes $(10 - 10)$ times its weight, so the total is $0$. Uniform region → no edge.

Step 3 — Column 3 (neighbours: 10 left, 200 right)

Each row gives $200 - 10 = 190$; weights $1 + 2 + 1 = 4$; total $4 \times 190 = 760$. Column 4 has left = 10 (column 3), right = 200 (column 5), so it's also $760$.

Answer & the takeaway

$0, 760, 760$: the response is large on both sides of the 10→200 boundary and zero inside the flat region. That's the algorithmic level. The implementation level is a neuron whose receptive field has an excitatory side and an inhibitory side — the simple cells of Chapter 10 compute something very like this.

3. Tinbergen's four questions

Marr's levels are about a system as it is right now. Tinbergen (1963) — an ethologist — added time: how did this behavior come about in the individual, and in the species?

QuestionCore questionClosest Marr levelExample: movement
Function (adaptation)Why does this behavior exist? What is it good for?ComputationalFind food, avoid danger, build shelter, interact with the world
Mechanism (causation)What produces the behavior right now?Algorithmic + ImplementationAlgorithm: maximize utility — rewards (food) minus costs (effort, error). Implementation: neural circuits represent costs and rewards, select actions, issue motor commands, activate muscles
Development (ontogeny)How does it emerge over the lifespan?Cuts across all 3Reactive → predictive: early movements rely on slow sensory feedback; with experience, control becomes predictive and efficient
Evolution (phylogeny)How did it arise across generations / species?Cuts across all 3Brains may have evolved, in part, for movement — the sea-squirt story
The sea-squirt story (the lecture names it; here it is) going deeper A juvenile sea squirt swims around with a simple nervous system looking for a rock. Once it attaches permanently and no longer needs to move, it digests most of its own brain. The moral: a brain is for moving; no movement, no need for a brain.
Common mistake Confusing ontogeny (development in one lifetime — "onto" ≈ one) with phylogeny (evolution across species — "phylum"). And note the study guide spells it "Ontology"; the right word is ontogeny.
Try itYour own example (the L4 study-guide task)

Apply Marr's 3 levels and Tinbergen's 4 questions to face recognition. (Everything you need is in Chapter 8, but try it cold first.)

Marr's three levels

Computational: recognize individuals for communication, social interaction and emotion perception. Algorithmic: store many orientation-specific face templates; process faces holistically (the inversion effect). Implementation: the fusiform face area, responding ~150–170 ms after a face appears.

Tinbergen's four questions

Function: social living. Mechanism: the Marr algorithm + implementation answers above. Development: face recognition improves with experience — familiar faces are recognized across angles far better (the Dutch-politician demo). Evolution: social primates that could tell group members apart would have had an advantage.

The takeaway

Function ≈ computational; mechanism ≈ algorithmic + implementation; development and evolution are the extra questions Tinbergen adds, and they apply at every Marr level.

4. Representations: how you encode it decides how you solve it

Definition Representation — how information about the world is encoded in the mind. The same fact can be encoded symbolically ($x^2 + y^2 = z^2$) or visuospatially (a picture of a right triangle ◣).

Problem 1 — fold a sheet of paper 50 times

Estimate the thickness before you look. If you imagine it visually — a stack of paper getting a bit taller — you'll guess a few centimetres or metres. Represent it symbolically — thickness × $2^{50}$ — and the answer is suddenly obvious: it's astronomical.

Doubling, represented numerically
Assumes 0.1 mm paper. What to notice: the bar is on a log scale — each fold moves it the same distance. Around 42 folds you pass the distance to the Moon (~384,400 km); at 50 you're at roughly 293 times that. The lecture's answer, "greater than 384,400 km", is a large understatement.

Problem 2 — the mountain climber

A climber leaves the base of Mt. Washington at 8 am and reaches the summit at 8 pm. Next morning she leaves the summit at 8 am and reaches the base at 8 pm, same path. Must there be a spot she passes at exactly the same time of day on both trips?

Symbolically this is hard. Visually it's trivial: draw both days on the same clock.

Superimpose the two days — they must cross
What to notice: however you set the paces, one line starts at the bottom and ends at the top, the other does the reverse — so they must cross. Equivalent picture: two climbers on the same day, one going up and one coming down, must meet.

The mental imagery debate

Shepard / Kosslyn"We have an inner mental visuospatial image." Evidence: in "same or different?" rotated-object tasks, reaction time scales with rotation angle — as if the image is continuously rotated in the mind's eye. Later backed by imaging.
Pylyshyn"We don't have mental images, we only have symbols." The feeling of a picture is an illusion over a symbolic code.
Mental rotation: the prediction that decides the debate (schematic)
Angle between the two objects (0° → 180°) Reaction time images rotated in the mind: RT grows with angle (observed) pure symbols: no reason for RT to depend on angle
Schematic of the logic, not the original data. What to notice: the two theories make different behavioral predictions — that's what makes it a science question.

5. Processes — and how they shape representations

Definition Processes — the maintenance and manipulation of mental representations: how information is transformed in the mind (e.g. mental rotation).

The influence runs both ways:

Representation → processing Chunking. Hold 1 4 9 2 1 7 7 6 2 0 0 1 in memory — hard. Now hold 1492 · 1776 · 2001 — easy. Same digits; the chunked representation leverages long-term memory, so short-term memory has 3 items to maintain instead of 12.
Processing → representation Priming. After "river", "bank" means riverbank; after "money", a financial bank. What you just processed changes what gets represented.

The "12 and 5" demo

Answer 2+2, 4+4, 8+8, 16+16 quickly, then "pick a number between 12 and 5." Most people say 7. Two hypotheses from lecture:

  1. Arithmetic priming: you were primed to do arithmetic — $12 - 5 = 7$ (or $12 + 5 = 17$).
  2. Trying to be random: people disproportionately choose 7, avoiding even numbers (6, 8, 10) and "obvious" ones (9 = 3×3; 11).
Try itHow would you test these hypotheses? (lecture asks, never answers)

Design an experiment that tells hypothesis 1 from hypothesis 2.

Step 1 — What does each predict differently?

Priming says the preceding arithmetic causes 7. "Random-seeming" says people pick 7 regardless of what came before.

Step 2 — Manipulate the thing hypothesis 1 cares about

Two groups: one does the addition warm-up, one does an unrelated warm-up (e.g. naming colours). Then both pick a number between 12 and 5. Bonus: a third group primed with subtraction, and a range where the difference isn't 7 (e.g. between 13 and 5 → difference 8).

Answer & the takeaway

If the addition group says 7 much more than the control group, priming matters. If both groups say 7 equally, it's the "random-looking" preference. With 13 and 5: priming predicts 8, randomness-preference still predicts 7. The skill: turn each hypothesis into a behavioral prediction that the other hypothesis doesn't make.

Count the F's

FINISHED FILES ARE THE RESULT OF YEARS OF SCIENTIFIC STUDY COMBINED WITH THE EXPERIENCE OF YEARS

Answer: 6 (FINISHED, FILES, SCIENTIFIC, and three OFs). Many people count 3. Why? We read for meaning, not letter by letter, so function words like "of" are skimmed — and in "of" the F sounds like a V, so a sound-based check misses it too. The process (reading for meaning) determines the representation (the words that "count").

6. Check yourself

"Neurons in V1 respond to edges of a particular orientation" is a statement at which Marr level?
Why: It's about physical hardware (neurons in a place). "Compute the intensity difference across a boundary" would be algorithmic; "we need edges to recognize objects" would be computational.
"Infants' reaching starts out slow and feedback-driven and becomes predictive with experience" answers which Tinbergen question?
Why: Change across one individual's lifespan = development (ontogeny). Evolution would be change across species or generations.
Mental rotation reaction times increase with rotation angle. This supports…
Why: Rotating a picture farther takes longer; a symbolic code has no natural reason to care about angle.
A rocket, a helicopter and a bird all fly. In Marr's terms they share the same…
Why: Same problem (get airborne), different algorithms (thrust, rotation for lift, flapping), different hardware. The point of the flight table.